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In two experiments, we evaluated whether a perceiver’s prior expectations could alone
obliterate his or her awareness of a salient visual stimulus. To establish expectancy,
observers first made a demanding visual discrimination on each of three baseline trials.
Then, on a fourth, critical trial, a single, salient and highly visible object appeared in full
view at the center of the visual field and in the absence of any competing visual input.
Surprisingly, fully half of the participants were unaware of the solitary object in front of their
eyes. Dramatically, observers were blind even when the only stimulus on display was the
face of U.S. President Barack Obama. We term this novel, counterintuitive phenomenon,
Barack Obama Blindness (BOB). Employing a method that rules out putative memory
effects by probing awareness immediately after presentation of the critical stimulus, we
demonstrate that the BOB effect is a true failure of conscious vision.
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INTRODUCTION
Visual perception arises not only from external stimulus information impinging on
photoreceptors in the retina, but also from top-down processes—including attention,
expectation, and task set—that interact with incoming visual information (Gilbert and Li,
2013). Top-down processes bias competition between objects presented simultaneously in the
visual field (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). Conversely, in the absence of sensory competition,
as when an object appears in isolation, the cognitive processes that bias competition are
dispensable, suggesting that an isolated object would invariably reach a perceiver’s awareness
(van Boxtel et al., 2010). In the current study we examined this prediction, while also
manipulating perceivers’ prior expectations, to explore the conditions under which conscious
perception of salient visual objects is eliminated.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that attention alters the appearance of consciously
perceived objects (Carrasco et al., 2004; Gobell and Carrasco, 2005; Liu et al., 2006). The most
convincing of these behavioral results emerges from experiments investigating inattentional
blindness (IB; Rock et al., 1992; Mack and Rock, 1998). IB is a failure to consciously perceive
otherwise fully visible objects once another activity engages attention. In IB experiments,
participants perform an attentionally demanding task during a set of baseline trials. Then, on the
critical trial, a new object unexpectedly appears together with the stimuli comprising the primary
task. A significant proportion of participants fails to notice the new object, particularly (and
interestingly) when the object appears at the center of the visual field (Mack and Rock, 1998).
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Although several early IB studies presented the critical object
in near isolation (Rock et al., 1992), to the best of our knowledge
in no studies has the critical trial been restricted to a display
of the novel object alone. Thus, no previous IB study has
been able to unambiguously distinguish the role of top-down
influences from the effects of sensory competition alone on
the appearance of visual objects. The current study fills this
important gap. Subsequent IB studies (including from our
laboratory) explored different subtypes of top-down influences
on IB, including spatial IB (Newby and Rock, 1998) and feature-
based IB (Persuh et al., 2014). Yet the fundamental limitation of
the original and all subsequent IB studies is that the unexpected
object appears alongside stimuli from the primary attention
task. In correcting this limitation in the current study we also
are able to address an alternative interpretation of IB, namely,
that the failure to report novel objects signifies forgetting, that
is inattentional amnesia, rather than true perceptual blindness
(Wolfe, 1999).
The IB paradigm is well suited to examine contributions
on conscious perception from both stimulus characteristics and
top-down influences. Although certain stimulus characteristics,
such as unique color or sudden onset, increase the probability
that a novel object will be consciously perceived, in fact the
major factor determining conscious perception is the observer’s
attentional set (Most et al., 2005). Participants engaged in an
attentionally demanding activity, for example, are more likely to
detect an unexpected object when its features (e.g., brightness)
resemble those of attended objects (Most et al., 2001), even when
the shared features are semantic (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2007;
Most, 2013).
Behavioral experiments using IB align with recent results
from neurophysiological research. Influences on visual
perception from top-down processing have been extensively
documented across all stages of the visual hierarchy (Gilbert
and Sigman, 2007; Gilbert and Li, 2013). These influences can
spread as far back as the lateral geniculate nucleus (O’Connor
et al., 2002; McAlonan et al., 2008). Recent evidence suggests
that top-down processes reach the level of individual neurons,
shaping receptive fields in primary visual cortex (Li et al., 2004).
Top-down expectations can even alter cell properties and modify
selectivity across a population of V1 superficial layer neurons
(McManus et al., 2011). Such neural influences have been
observed even before the stimulus presentation (Kastner et al.,
1999; Ress et al., 2000).
The neurophysiological findings suggest that, in creating
a set of filters in early visual areas to calibrate tuning
properties, expectation and other top-down processes aid in
resolving competition between two or more objects (Desimone
and Duncan, 1995). The use of competing stimuli in visual
neurophysiological research is ubiquitous because, without
competition, top-down modulation is largely unnecessary
(Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004). Indeed, neurophysiological
evidence suggests that when presented in isolation, perceivers in
any attentional state will always become aware of the isolated
object (van Boxtel et al., 2010). Yet this hypothesis has never
been tested directly in either behavioral or neurophysiological
research. That is exactly our approach in the current behavioral
study. We tested naive participants in a modified version of the
classic IB paradigm (Mack and Rock, 1998). Participants first
performed a series of baseline trials to establish expectations
about upcoming stimuli. Then, on the critical trial, only
the novel object appeared at the center of the display.
We asked whether participants fail to consciously perceive
a single, isolated object in the absence of any sensory
competition.
EXPERIMENT 1
We tested whether the repeated exposure in an attentionally
demanding task to a specific category of objects creates an
expectation in which a highly salient object fails to reach
awareness, even when presented in the absence of other objects.
Participants first performed three (baseline) trials of a gender
comparison task to pairs of faces in the visual periphery. Then,
on the critical trial, a salient (non-face) object appeared alone at
the center of the display, without faces or any other stimuli on
the screen. We asked whether participants consciously perceived
this novel object.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty participants (11 females), between ages 18–24
(M = 20.1 years), were tested after providing informed consent.
Sample size was based on estimated power from a previous
pilot experiment. The Institutional Review Board of the City
University of New York approved the protocol. All participants
were recruited from the undergraduate subject pool of The City
College of New York, receiving course credit for participation.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and
were free of any neurological diseases.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Participants were seated in a dimly lit, sound attenuated booth.
A chin rest, positioned 57 cm from a CRT monitor with a
refresh rate of 100 Hz, was used to prevent head movements.
Stimuli were two faces, subtending 5.5◦, presented 6.4◦ from a
central, white fixation dot, subtending 0.3◦. Faces were extracted
from a database of face stimuli, varying along a male-to-female
continuum (Zhao et al., 2011). The novel object, presented at
the center of the display on critical trials, was one of the four
shapes—square, circle, diamond or star—each subtending 1◦
(L = 0 cd/m2) . A visual mask, subtending 18.2◦, comprised
black lines in random orientations. Stimuli appeared on a gray
background (L = 13 cd/m2) .
Procedure
Each session consisted of five experimental trials, preceded
by four baseline practice trials. Participants were instructed
to fixate a dot in the center of the display and to determine
whether a pair of faces was same or different in gender. Each
trial began with the fixation dot presented for 1500 ms. Then,
on each of the three baseline trials, the two faces appeared
diagonally across the screen for 100 ms, followed by a visual
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FIGURE 1 | A diagram of the trial sequence in Experiment 1. Each
participant was first presented with three baseline trials, followed by the critical
trial. The last, control trial was identical to the critical trial.
mask for 500 ms (Figure 1). The diagonal and the gender of
each face were determined randomly on each trial. Participants
reported their responses verbally, which were entered manually
by an experimenter. On the fourth, critical trial, no faces were
presented; instead, one of the four shapes (square, arrow, star
or circle) appeared at the center of display for 100 ms, followed
by the visual mask for 500 ms. Each shape was presented with
equal frequency across participants. Immediately, the participant
was asked whether or not anything new appeared on the screen,
and his or her response was recorded. The participant was then
told that indeed a new shape had appeared. The participant was
shown the four possible shapes, presented horizontally side-by-
side at the center of the display, and asked to select the actual
shape. The shapes remained on the screen until the participant
made a decision, which the experimenter recorded. Order of the
four shapes on the screen was random for each participant. A
final, fifth trial, the control trial, was identical to the prior critical
trial; the shape presented on the critical trial was presented again.
The participant was again asked if anything new appeared on
the screen, and then asked to select the new object among the
four possible shapes.
Results
Participants found gender discrimination in the baseline trials
difficult, with performance averaging 61.7%. In answer to the
question of whether they perceived anything new on the critical
trial, fully half of the participants replied that they had not
noticed a novel object (Figure 2). Of those participants, only two
(20%), a chance-level value, correctly identified the novel object
in a forced-choice task. Of the participants who acknowledged
a new object, most (90%) were able to identify the object
correctly in the forced-choice procedure. On the fifth, control
trial, almost all of the participants (95%) now admitted being
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of participants consciously perceiving the
novel object in the critical and control trials in Experiment 1.
aware of a new object, a percentage significantly outpacing
awareness in the critical trial (McNemar’s exact test, p = 0.004);
most of the participants who were aware of the new object
also were able to select it in the forced-choice procedure
(89.5%).
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1, which employed a demanding discrimination task
in baseline trials, revealed a significant degree of blindness to
geometric shapes presented at the center of the display in the
absence of any competing visual input. Yet it is possible that
blindness to isolated objects only manifests with such strong
top-down influences. In Experiment 2, we employed an easier
baseline discrimination task, and we presented on the critical
trial a novel object that was truly engaging: the face of President
Barack Obama. We asked whether blindness persists even for
such a highly familiar stimulus in the context of a less demanding
discrimination task.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty students (10 females), between ages 18–35
(M = 20.7 years), recruited from the undergraduate subject pool
of The City College of New York, were tested after consenting
to participate and received course credit for participation.
Sample size was based on estimated power from a previous pilot
experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were free of any neurological diseases.
Stimuli, Apparatus and Procedure
Stimuli, apparatus and procedures were similar to Experiment 1,
except for the following modifications. On baseline trials, two
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FIGURE 3 | A diagram of the trial sequence in Experiment 2. Each
participant was presented first with three baseline trials, followed by the critical
trial. The last, control trial was identical to the critical trial. The order of
forced-choice alternatives was randomized; in this example, from left to right:
Angelina Jolie, alarm clock, Barack Obama, lion head.
orange squares (x = 0.49, y = 0.44, L = 29 cd/m2 and
x = 0.45, y = 0.47, L = 39 cd/m2), subtending 4.7◦, were
presented in the periphery of the display (Figure 3). On the
critical (fourth) and control (fifth) trials, the face of President
Barack Obama, subtending 1◦, was presented at the center of
the display. The forced-choice display contained the face of
Barack Obama, the face of Angelina Jolie, a head of a lion,
and the face of a clock. Each subtended approximately 1◦
of visual angle. The visual mask comprised multiple circular
stimuli, obtained by superimposing rotated and transparent
versions of different objects. The trial structure was identical
to Experiment 1. Participants performed same/different color
discrimination on three baseline trials. On the critical trial
and control trials, the face of President Barack Obama was
presented to every participant, followed by the forced-choice
identification.
Results
Performance on color discrimination during the baseline trials
was high, averaging 85%. When asked on the critical trial
whether they noticed anything new, astonishingly, fully 60%
of participants failed to notice the engaging face of Barack
Obama directly before their eyes (Figure 4). Indeed, only
8.3% of participants who responded ‘‘no’’ correctly selected
Barack Obama’s face in forced choice, a value lower than
chance level. Only 40% of participants acknowledged a new
object; among participants who perceived a face (4), all
were able to select the President’s face in a forced-choice
procedure. Four participants reported seeing something and all
selected the clock in the forced-choice procedure. By contrast,
almost all of the participants responded ‘‘yes’’ on the control
trial (95%), significantly exceeding awareness on the critical trial
(McNemar’s exact test, p = 0.001); almost all of these (94.7%)
correctly selected the President’s face among the alternatives.
FIGURE 4 | Percentage of participants consciously perceiving the
novel object in the critical and control trials in Experiment 2.
DISCUSSION
In two experiments, we demonstrated an extreme example
of blindness to a single, centrally presented stimulus in the
absence of sensory competition. Participants in both experiments
established expectations about stimuli in the upcoming trial
and so failed to consciously perceive a novel, salient stimulus
when these expectations were violated. Experiment 2 provided
especially dramatic evidence of blindness because here a highly
meaningful and familiar stimulus, the face of President Barack
Obama, appeared alone on the screen in the absence of any
competing stimuli and in the context of a relatively easy color
discrimination task. The Barack Obama Blindness (BOB) effect
sheds new light on the role of top-down processes in visual
perception, providing evidence for unanticipated limitations of
conscious vision.
Many previous studies have, like ours, examined the role of
attentional set in IB (Most et al., 2001; Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2007; Most, 2013). One recent study examined the role of task
relevance using a simple two-object display composed of colored
circle surrounded by a differently colored ring (Eitam et al.,
2013). Although observers expected the stimuli, and were able
to report task-relevant color, up to 25% were unable to report
the color of the task-irrelevant stimulus. Authors suggested that
observers likely perceived both colors but were perhaps unable
to conceptualize the irrelevant color thus displaying intentional
amnesia.
Ours is the first study to present a single, unexpected stimulus
in isolation on the critical trial. This is significant because it
has been suggested that top-down mechanisms are required
to resolve competition between items in the visual field, and
become progressively less critical when only few objects are
present. Consequently, it has been assumed that for conscious
experience of a single, isolated object there is no need to engage
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such mechanisms (van Boxtel et al., 2010). The BOB effect
strongly suggests otherwise: when an observer’s expectations are
violated, even a single object will not be perceived, despite robust
sensory evidence. Even IB experiments in which the critical
object appears in near isolation are unable to unambiguously
rule out the effects of sensory competition over violations of
expectation, as shown here. In other attention paradigms, such
as attentional blink, blindness occurs to isolated targets presented
briefly, as here, but only after participants are first shown another
target stimulus (∼200 ms prior) and then are fully expecting the
critical second target stimulus to appear (Raymond et al., 1992).
One common criticism of IB studies is that the failure to
report an unexpected stimulus may reflect a failure of memory
rather than a failure of awareness. On this account, IB is
actually inattentional amnesia (Wolfe, 1999). Yet the criticism
only applies if participants must first make a response to the
primary stimuli, during which time memory of the unexpected
stimuli may fade. In our modification of the traditional IB
paradigm (Mack and Rock, 1998; Cartwright-Finch and Lavie,
2007) participants never made responses on the critical trial,
instead being asked immediately about the novel stimulus.
Thus, the failure of our participants to report the new stimulus
demonstrates a true absence of conscious perception, and not
mere forgetting.
Although the percentage of unaware participants in
Experiment 1 who selected the correct shape during the
forced-choice procedure was at a level expected by chance,
the percentage of unaware participants in Experiment 2 who
correctly selected Barack Obama during forced choice was lower
than chance. A probable explanation for this observation is
participants’ response bias: presented with four possible objects,
participants likely assumed that they would be the least likely to
miss the face of the American president and so opted for one of
the other three possibilities.
In conclusion, our study is the first to provide evidence of a
profound effect of top-down processes on unexpected stimuli in
the absence of sensory competition, here termed the BOB effect.
Our study shows the fundamental role of top-down processes
in establishing perceptual awareness for single objects. These
processes are instrumental for perception of even highly familiar
faces, such as that of President Barack Obama.
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